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ABSTRACT 
 
Morningstar has identified 85 companies with wide economic moats.  According to Morningstar 
these firms enjoy structural advantages that create shareholder value.  This paper confirms the 
historical outperformance of these companies. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
nder its Bellwether 50 panoply, Morningstar includes firms with an especially wide economic moat.  
Because of their structural defenses, these companies enjoy sustainable competitive advantage.  They 
can repel invaders intent on purloining market share.   
 
The dictionary defines a “moat” as a “deep, wide ditch surrounding a fortification.”  While dry ditches 
were regarded as better than none, wide-water moats afforded optimal protection from assault.  These water barriers 
were more than a dozen feet wide and could measure 30 feet in depth.  Some of these waterways even contained 
submerged, jagged stakes to impede prospective assailants. 
 
The notion of an economic moat finds early expression in Warren Buffet.  As investment vehicles Buffet 
selects firms with “economic castles protected by unbreachable moats” (Morningstar, 2004, p. 10).  In his work on 
competitive strategy, Michael Porter (1980) has identified many of the features that characterize such firms, and 
Morningstar acknowledges a debt to Porter in its classification scheme.   
 
According to Morningstar (Sellers, 2003), there are four basic moats (Figure 1).  The first type stems 
from economies of scale and low cost production.  These scale economies are based on infrastructure capabilities 
and distribution networks.  This cost leadership can insure wide-moat status despite a product‟s commodity flavor.  
A noteworthy example is Dell with its direct sales distribution of computer hardware. 
 
High customer-switching costs can also confer wide-moat status.  By delivering quality product in a 
timely manner, a company can engrain its customer base.  This loyal clientele would require considerable incentive 
to switch to a competitor.  Physicians, for example, are slow to forego customary protocols.  When retraining is 
necessary, as it was for Zimmer‟s two-hip procedure, the company made physicians sign exclusivity contracts.  At 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange clearing customers are apt to stay “sticky” because the “Merc” assumes all 
counterparty risk.   
 
Intangible assets represent the third kind of economic moat.  This rubric subsumes everything from chip 
design to drug compounds.  Medtronic‟s intellectual property portfolio is an example.  Leveraging its knowledge of 
the heart‟s electrical conduction system, Medtronic has extended its cardiovascular “signal technology” to 
neurological and physiological products.  Government permits also serve as intangible assets. Licensing 
requirements can bar the entry of potential competitors.  By legally staving off competition, those already in the fold 
can secure their hold.  Morningstar suggests brand franchise is another form of intangible asset since name 
recognition can confer pricing power.  Some would argue whether brand automatically ensures competitive 
advantage.  In its most recent poll, Business Week (2004) accorded Coca-Cola distinction as the world‟s premier 
brand.  One reader responded tersely: “Brand is garbage.  Performance is everything” (p. 26).  Yet firms such as 
Harley-Davidson are profoundly evocative in their imagery.  Harley is determined to preserve and broaden this halo, 
U 
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having recently lowered its bike seats in an attempt to woo women.  Finally, Morningstar avers that a unique 
corporate culture can widen a moat and contribute to performance.  Again, corporate culture alone might not be a 
harbinger of success.  Morningstar itself assigns narrow moats to some firms with distinctive cultures.  Jabil Circuit 
is highly regarded for its horizontal work model with dedicated customer teams while Danaher has a culture of 
continuous improvement based on Toyota‟s legendary practices. Yet Morningstar considers the moat of each firm to 
be narrow.  
 
Network economics is the final determinant of wide-moat status.  The network effect is the least evident 
of the four types but is manifest in a cadre of companies.  EBay is an exemplary example.  Its 114 million registered 
users eviscerate competitive threat.  As the network subsumes more buyers and sellers, it enhances the value for 
every user.  Morningstar suggests that the network effect can also be observed in software products that glue 
correspondents through a common medium.  Microsoft has done so through its ubiquitous operating system and 
Autodesk has provided a liaison for many construction designers. 
 
DO MOATS MATTER? 
 
Morningstar would counsel investors to be wary of splendid castles with shallow moats.  The allure of 
such edifices will prove ephemeral.  Morningstar cites PalmOne whose market value plummeted from $30 billion in 
the fall of 2000 to less than $2 billion today.  If such stocks populate a portfolio, they should be there solely for 
trading purposes.  Only wide-moat companies will sustain success over the long haul.  Morningstar cautions readers 
to shun flash and seize cash.  Kenny Rogers‟ gambling man sings a similar admonition: “You gotta know when to 
hold „em and know when to fold „em.” 
 
While Morningstar‟s premise is intuitively appealing, it should nonetheless undergo empirical scrutiny.  
Morningstar postulates that over a five-year period wide-moat stocks will generate shareholder value through 
increased earnings power and price appreciation.  Buffet and Morningstar further maintain that these firms will 
demonstrate stability in their earnings trajectory.  If such observations prove accurate, they will lend credence to 
Morningstar‟s claim that wide-moat stocks are for buy and hold.  Moreover, it is timely to test Morningstar‟s thesis 
because investment houses are now under mandate to consider “independent” research. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Morningstar has compiled a “Bellwether 50” list of large-caps with wide economic moats.  More 
recently, it has also devised a compendium of 35 wide-moat mid-caps.  The present study will test the aggregate 
performance of these two sets over a five-year period as well as a select subset.    
 
Inclusion on Morningstar‟s wide-moat roster does not presume a “should buy” recommendation.  The 
“Bellwether 50” and the 35 mid-caps are not so much “buy” lists as “watch” lists (Larson, 2003).  Even if a 
company‟s moat remains wide and deep, growth potential can already be priced into its shares.  Wide-moat stocks, 
though, do carry a connotation of “should have bought” – and perhaps “buy” if they hit a rough patch of road.  
When that occurs, Morningstar enjoins its readers: “If it feels bad, do it.”  Investors should poise their bats for such 
“fat pitches” (Sellers, 2004).  In swinging, investors should exercise caution in view of Morningstar pronounced bias 
toward low price.  Its research analysts adeptly underscore potential concerns, especially for fully priced firms.  Yet 
these same analysts tend to tout companies when they stumble or even tumble.  Instances range from Devry to 
Krispy Kreme.  In purchasing such companies, might investors ignore the very events that precipitated the plunge? 
 
The study employed three measures to track financial performance.  The first two measures, growth in 
earnings per share (EPS) and stability of earnings per share, are derived from First Call.  The EPS growth number 
represents annualized earnings per share growth over the past five years.  The earnings stability number reflects the 
consistency of earnings per share growth over the past five years.  The lower the number, the more uniform growth 
has been.  For companies showing predictable earnings streams, there is a smaller than average percentage 
difference between reported EPS and trend EPS.  Combined with earnings growth data, the stability figure provides 
a multi-dimensional view of earnings growth.  These earnings dimension numbers go through the June Quarter of 
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2004.  Value Line‟s measure of Price Growth Persistence is used to measure Stock Growth.  This number measures 
the historic tendency of a stock to show persistent share appreciation compared to the average stock.  Value Line 
Persistence ratings range from 100 (highest) to 5 (lowest).  The Value Line numbers used in this study are those 
closest to the end of the June 2004 quarter. 
 
Selection Of A Subset 
 
The author has identified a subset of seven that seems particularly reflective of Morningstar‟s criteria 
(Table 1). 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1: Types Of Economic Moats 
 
1. Economies of Scale/Low-Cost Producer - e.g. Teva Pharmaceuticals 
2. High Customer-Switching Costs - e.g. Kinder Morgan  
3. Intangible Assets 
a. Patent Protection – e.g. Qualcomm 
b. Government Permits – e.g. Stericycle 
c. Brand Franchise – e.g. Weight Watchers International 
d. Unique Corporate Culture – e.g. Expeditors International of WA 
4. Network Effect - e.g. Adobe 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Economies Of Scale 
 
Teva boasts the drug industry‟s largest generic pipeline of 109 abbreviated applications.  This funnel 
equates to $67 billion in branded-drug sales.  Changes to Medicare will facilitate generic approval and may result in 
a 2006 bonanza.  Teva‟s distribution channels are well established, and the firm has a foothold in the nascent field of 
generic biologics. 
 
High Customer Switching Costs 
 
Kinder Morgan owns 35,000 miles of pipes and collects a toll on all the natural gas moving through them.  
Since regulatory approvals effectively pose barriers, Kinder‟s customers have few alternatives.  Service contracts 
tend to be of long duration.  Merrill Lynch says of the company: “It is not a household name but they quietly touch a 
lot of households” (Brothwell, 2004, p. 2).  
 
Intangible Assets – Patent Protection 
 
Qualcomm is another toll collector, exacting a royalty for each CDMA phone sold.  This tariff garners the 
company 90 percent pre-tax margins.  Given low teledensity rates, Qualcomm views China and India as enormous 
emergent markets.  It also expects to benefit from Europe‟s move to W-CDMA. 
 
Intangible Assets – Government Permits 
 
Stericycle transports and treats medical waste from 304,000 medical centers, enjoying revenue 17 times 
greater than its closest rival.  The company‟s scale allows it to be the low-cost producer.  Hospitals readily outsource 
the complex regulatory and legal issues of toxic disposal.  As the population turns more silver, waste removal will 
increase. 
 
Intangible Assets – Brand Franchise 
 
As the “low-carb” fad starts to fade, dietary flexibility and dietary safety may prove a sustainable 
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advantage for Weight Watchers.  The social bonding that occurs in meetings induces three quarters of attendees to 
return at some point.  This company has few capital requirements and benefits from a variable cost structure.  
 
Intangible Assets – Unique Corporate Culture 
 
Morningstar lauds Expeditors International for its unique, incentive-based culture.  This freight-
forwarding firm melds company finances and employee compensation.  Since base salaries are modest, employees 
look toward a bonus based on the company‟s pretax profit.  Individual offices also retain a portion of operating 
profit for allocation to their own staff.  Credit Suisse calls Expeditors “the gem of the global logistics industry” 
(Barnes and Gardner, 2004, p. 98). 
 
The Network Effect 
 
Adobe has created the de facto standard for developing and deploying electronic documents.  More than 
500 million computers have downloaded its Acrobat product.  Moreover, Photoshop and Illustrator have become a 
preferred conduit for creative professionals who see no reason to switch.    
 
STUDY FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS     
 
Morningstar‟s segmentation of wide moat stocks achieved historical outperformance along all study 
dimensions.  Both the large-cap and mid-cap samples demonstrated robust earnings growth and earnings stability.  
As expected, such strong historical performance was associated with share price appreciation.  Relative to the 
market, the aggregate appreciation of large-caps (Table 2) surpassed more than 85 percent of all stocks and the mid-
caps (Table 3) more than 78 percent.  While there were individual laggards on both lists, they were relatively few in 
number.  The author‟s subset (Table 4) demonstrated the most pronounced gains.  All three lists would have handily 
surpassed the S&P benchmark during the period of -2.21.   
 
Since Morningstar‟s approach seems to have merit, ongoing studies should test it further.  In particular, if 
researchers can deduce numeric scores to represent moat width, they can determine whether such numbers predict 
absolute share performance.  For example, one might hypothesize that companies with an overlapping matrix of 
multiple moats outperform companies with single moats.  A firm like Stericycle would exemplify scale, sticky 
customers and intangible assets.  Most Japanese castles had multiple moats, thereby compounding the challenge for 
opposing armies.   
 
The Morningstar‟s Bellwether 50 roster has remained relatively immutable during its  three-year 
existence as has the more recent mid-cap list (Larson, 2003).  A more persuasive study will occur when the lists 
themselves can claim longevity of five years.  Then year five year stock measurements can commence with the 
origination of the Morningstar list.  After all, the real key is to spot a stock before an appreciable advance.  
 
Should more extensive studies validate Morningstar‟s segmentation, researchers should reflect on an 
inherent dilemma.  Morningstar considers wide-moat characteristics to be “long-term structural advantages” 
(Sellers, 2003a, 2004).  This conviction minimizes the importance of leadership.  Morningstar concurs with Peter 
Lynch‟s observation that some companies can make money even with a monkey at the helm – and such a realization 
is reassuring because this situation might very well occur.  This is a digestively difficult notion for these times.  
Today‟s paucity of leaders suggests a compelling need for leadership.  It is the province of leadership to ensure that 
sustainable competitive advantages are in place.  Stock pickers must also become time travelers, fully cognizant that 
the wide moats of today may become the dry ditches of tomorrow.  The sage investor will prospect for arenas where 
new companies can build wide moats.  Such explorers will scan for emergent secular themes and then search for 
companies strategically positioned to enact those themes.  If Morningstar lists are to claim relevancy, in another 
decade the roster may reflect water purification, homeland security, digital rights, health care information systems, 
“silver tech” at home medical devices, RFID technology and a host of other themes that visionaries sense even if 
they do not yet fully see.        
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Table 2: Morningstar Bellwether 50 
Company Name Historical Earnings Historical Stability Stock Growth 
SLM ** 18.11 5.51 100 
Comcast**  NA NA NA 
Pfizer**  18.89 9.03 85 
Anheuser-Busch**  11.87 31.15 95 
Paychex**  13.27 7.73 80 
eBay*  108.95 22.89 65 
Genentech*  26.35 8.23 NMF 
Amgen  17.24 8.80 80 
Sysco  19.56 9.57 95 
Medtronic  15.96 3.69 95 
AstraZeneca PLC  -1.53 19.28 NA 
Home Depot  16.03 12.93 65 
Johnson & Johnson  16.00 13.68 95 
Applied Materials  -22.11 120.78 70 
Wal-Mart Stores  13.47 12.52 80 
United Parcel Service  3.66 7.50 NMF 
Microsoft  8.77 7.07 65 
Berkshire Hathaway  51.51 138.74 95 
Coca-Cola  11.07 14.67 40 
Wells Fargo  13.37 2.24 100 
Marsh & McLennan   12.13 11.47 90 
First Data  20.69 9.32 75 
Altria Group  8.47 6.96 60 
Automatic Data Processing  7.33 16.86 80 
Citigroup  9.77 9.57 90 
Eli Lilly & Company  2.60 6.86 90 
Colgate-Palmolive  13.36 3.71 100 
Fifth Third Bancorp  16.28 4.28 100 
AFLAC  17.11 2.91 100 
PepsiCo  12.50 9.38 85 
Bank of New York  -5.04 32.94 80 
American Express  6.21 32.81 85 
General Dynamics  10.38 5.41 95 
Dell  8.97 12.13 75 
Wrigley Wm Jr  10.19 6.62 90 
State Street  11.60 5.83 95 
Progressive  91.42 87.89 90 
United Technologies  15.03 17.18 100 
Walgreen  16.40 14.09 100 
Procter & Gamble  12.03 16.61 85 
Boston Scientific  6.25 15.88 60 
Capital One Financial  31.31 5.08 100 
3M Company  9.94 6.82 95 
Gillette  5.52 16.10 40 
Harley-Davidson  30.29 6.28 90 
Hershey Foods  13.79 29.80 85 
Biogen IDEC  48.83 27.00 90 
Avon Products  14.74 24.28 100 
Intel  -10.11 44.66 75 
Stryker  28.63 6.34 100 
Bellwether 50 Average 17.08 19.41 84.89 
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Table 3: Mid-Caps With Moats 
Company Name Historical Earnings Historical Stability Stock Growth 
Fidelity National Fin** 44.35 27.68 85 
Iron Mountain** 82.79 26.24 70 
Biomet* 18.31 2.23 95 
Getty Images* 26.47 54.64 65 
Autodesk* 7.40 66.74 30 
Renaissance Re Holdings 39.72 17.70 NA 
Eaton Vance 8.18 18.29 90 
Weight Watchers 42.43 29.72 NMF 
Northern Trust 2.08 10.74 75 
Equifax -0.84 12.41 NMF 
Jack Henry & Associates 12.82 16.33 85 
Intuit 28.50 14.36 75 
Fiserv 21.39 3.81 100 
Washington Post 5.09 61.34 100 
Kinder Morgan 35.58 15.74 80 
IMS Health 9.32 13.83 40 
CH Robinson  18.93 5.61 95 
Guidant 14.37 6.13 90 
Cedar Fair LP -1.97 7.72 50 
McGraw-Hill Companies 13.25 85.68 100 
Teva Pharmaceuticals 42.48 5.72 NA 
John Wiley & Sons 11.26 44.03 95 
Dow Jones & Co -24.87 66.75 55 
Pitney Bowes 0.85 5.54 65 
Moody‟s 32.62 8.13 NMF 
Cintas 8.65 3.42 95 
Blackrock 22.52 3.21 NA 
International Speedway  21.62 28.09 85 
Block H&R -13.28 543.12 45 
Expeditors Intl  20.64 14.14 100 
Stericycle 41.56 11.04 90 
Gentex 11.99 9.64 95 
Total System Services 18.12 7.15 80 
Chicago Mercantile  NA NA NA 
Adobe Systems 10.06 17.58 55 
Mid-Cap Average 18.60 37.19 78.03 
 
 
Table 4: Subset Of Wide-Moat Stocks 
Company Name Historical Earnings Historical Stability Stock Growth 
Teva Pharmaceutical  42.48 5.72 NA 
Kinder Morgan 35.58 15.74 80 
Qualcomm 16.99 18.37 75 
Stericycle 41.56 11.04 90 
Weight Watchers  42.43 29.72 NMF 
Expeditors International  20.64 14.14 100 
Adobe Systems 10.06 17.58 55 
Subset Average 29.96 16.04 80 
**buy* sell 
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NOTES 
 
